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Abstract 
The U.S. and China are the world’s largest and second largest CO2 emitters, respectively, 
and to what extent the U.S. and China get involved in combating global climate change is 
extremely important both for lowering compliance costs of climate mitigation and 
adaptation and for moving international climate negotiations forward. While it is 
unavoidable that China will take on commitments at some specific point of time in the 
future, this paper has argued that the proposal for joint accession by the U.S. and China is 
not a way forward. For various reasons, such a proposal is in the U.S. interest, but is not 
in the interest of China. Given the U.S. political reality and institutional settings on the 
one hand and China’s over-riding concern about economic growth and poverty reduction 
on the other, the two countries are unlikely to take on emissions caps under an 
international regime, at least for the time being. Therefore, we need to explore the area 
where cooperation between the two countries to address climate change seems best. The 
research, development and deployment of clean technology is the area that is in the best 
interests of the two countries. The U.S. has adopted a technology-oriented approach to 
climate issues, and has launched the four multilateral initiatives on technology 
cooperation and the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP). 
China has participated in all these U.S.-led initiatives, and is a partner to the APP. 
Strengthened technology cooperation between the two countries through these initiatives 
and the APP has led some tangible benefits. However, it should be pointed out that while 
technology is a critical ingredient in a climate policy package, efforts such as the APP 
can only be part of the solution. They alone cannot ensure that best available technologies 
are always deployed in the marketplace, and that new technologies will roll out at the 
pace and on the scale that we need. In order to have such technology-oriented approach to 
play a full role, we do need a coordinated policy framework agreed via the Kyoto 
Protocol or a follow-up regime or the parent United Nations Framework Convention. 
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 1. Introduction 
For quite some time, the U.S. and China have pointed at the other as the culprit who is 
blocking the climate negotiation process. This leads to a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
U.S. rejects the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts major developing countries like China, 
Mexico and India, and thus it is conceivable that the U.S. would not re-join the 
international climate regime without more specific commitments than those general 
commitments from major developing countries. On the other hand, the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol will substantially reduce incentives to invest in clean 
development mechanism (CDM) projects that imply reduced financial flows channelled 
to developing countries through CDM. Given that China is widely regarded as the 
dominant host country of the CDM projects (Zhang, 2000a and 2004), the significant 
decrease in demand for permits as a result of the world’s largest single buyer remaining 
outside the international market of tradable permits would lower the gain of China 
substantially. Against this background, some American analysts (e.g., Stewart and 
Wiener, 2003) suggest joint accession by the U.S. and China. This proposal does have the 
merit of enhancing environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and helping 
stabilize the price of permits on the international market. It is certainly in the interest of 
the U.S. because the participation of China would substantially reduce the U.S. 
compliance costs and increase the environmental effectiveness. The question then is 
whether the joint accession proposal is in the interest of China. 
In this paper, we will look at this issue from the following perspectives: a) how 
does China value importance of maintaining unity of the Group of 77?; b) what lessons 
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has China learned from bilateral negotiations with the U.S. to work out the terms for 
China to get accession to the WTO?; c) what is the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that 
it re-joins the Kyoto Protocol only if major developing countries join?; d) what are 
implications of the U.S. strikingly reversed position on the commitments of developing 
countries in New Delhi for initiating discussions on joint accession by the U.S. and 
China?; and e) how would joint accession by the U.S. and China be perceived?. Although 
we argue that joint accession by the U.S. and China is not in the interest of China, the 
strengthened cooperation between the two largest emitters is crucial to any global efforts 
towards emissions reductions. In that context, we examine the four U.S.-led multilateral 
initiatives on technology cooperation and the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean 
Development and Climate, and evaluate their effectiveness in achieving the stated goals. 
 
 
2. Joint Accession by the U.S. and China 
I doubt the prospects for China’s interest in the joint accession proposal for the following 
reasons. 
First, although broad discussions and cooperation in the field of climate change 
continue between China and the U.S., it is doubtful that China would be willing to 
discuss joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. For historical reasons, China 
attributes great importance to maintaining unity of the Group of 77, and engaging in 
discussions on joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. may well be perceived as 
threatening the solidarity of that Group. Developing countries, including China, insist that 
industrialised countries should demonstrate taking the lead in reducing their greenhouse 
 4
 5
                                                
gas emissions before developing countries even consider taking on such commitments. 
With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and a very low scale of overall 
emissions reductions in the industrialised countries during the first commitment period 
(2008-2012), it is unclear whether developing countries would regard their wealthy 
counterparts as having taken the lead by the time of the second commitment period. This 
leaves it open to even get launching a dialogue on broadening future commitments on the 
negotiating agenda. One thing is clear, though, that when it comes to negotiating 
developing country commitments, it is in the interest of China to join with other 
developing countries and negotiate developing country commitments under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This will give China 
much more clout in the final collective bargaining to determine its emissions 
commitments.1 International climate negotiations in Bonn and Marrakech clearly 
demonstrate China’s devotion to the Kyoto Protocol. Table 1 shows the positions of 
China and the final decisions in the Marrakech Accords. It clearly shows that China is 
willing to give on many issues in order to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive and that China 
continues to aspire to be recognised as a responsible member of the international 
community. 
 
 
1 It is worthwhile mentioning that China had made a concession to U.S. demand for the 
extent of openness for markets of many products and services when undertaking a 
number of rounds of bilateral negotiations with the U.S. to work out the terms for China 
to get accession to the WTO. The reason why China gave in a great deal is because China 
faces both obligations and benefits from getting accession to the WTO. But the situation 
is quite different in case of implementing joint accession by the U.S. and China where 
China may well perceive only costs. 
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Nuclear projects under 
CDM 
Unilateral projects under 
CDM 
Composition of CDM 
Executive Board 
Share of proceeds 
Sink provisions under 
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol 
Fungibility between the 
three Kyoto mechanisms 
Issue 
Refrain from using 
nuclear power to generate 
CERs 
Allowed 
Allowed Not allowed 
Give Annex 1 countries 
more representatives 
Geographical 
representation 
Only CDM All three Kyoto 
mechanisms 
Additional sinks credits 
given to Russia, Japan 
and Canada 
No additional sinks 
credits to Annex 1 
countries 
CERs, ERUs, AAUs 
fungible 
No fungibility 
COP Decision China’s position 
Table 1  China’s Compromises in the Marrakech package 
Second, the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it will re-join the Kyoto 
Protocol or a follow-up regime only if major developing countries join as well is 
questionable. Given that the U.S. is the world’s largest economy and emitter of 
greenhouse gases, it has both the responsibility for the global climate problem and the 
ability to contribute to solving it. To have a significant long-term effect on global 
greenhouse gas emissions, a global climate regime eventually must include substantial 
participation by developing countries. But the U.S. conditioning its commitments on 
developing countries’ commitments is unlikely to induce participation by developing 
countries. In my view, unless the U.S. has made credible commitments itself, it does not 
have the moral right to persuade developing countries to take meaningful abatement 
actions. International climate negotiations prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol suggest that U.S. taking on the commitments first and then jawboning 
developing countries including China had some impact on the position of developing 
countries and the timing of their commitments (Zhang, 2000b).2
                                                 
2 Prior to Kyoto, developing counties’ demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership 
and the EU proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases 
below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which leads the world in 
greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. 
The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. 
economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. After Kyoto, the ball was kicked into 
China’s court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key developing countries, 
including China, on board had been and would continue to be its focus of international 
climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it will be countries like 
China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for China to make some kind of 
commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. The world’s media will 
undoubtedly bring attention to China’s non-participation, which will be seen as holding 
up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly even be blamed for 
“blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing countries’ 
commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public pressure on 
China had put China in a very uncomfortable position. It looked like China would be 
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Third, developing countries have been sensitive to commitment issues, and the 
U.S. position at the eight Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in New Delhi makes 
the launching of a dialogue on broadening future commitments difficult, not to mention 
to ask developing countries to take on commitments. The U.S. strikingly reversed the 
position on the commitments of developing countries in New Delhi in comparison with 
the position at Kyoto. At Kyoto, the U.S. called for stronger action by developing 
countries, but in New Delhi declared such discussion about developing country’s 
commitments premature. This would have long-term implications because developing 
countries would defend their position using this argument in the future when being asked 
to take on commitments. This certainly complicates initiating discussions on joint 
accession by the U.S. and China. 
Fourth, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol does nothing but erode trust 
and reinforce the stalemate between the North and the South, and it is difficult to imagine 
that China and India would assume emissions targets before the U.S. re-entry into Kyoto 
or a follow-up regime. Doing so would be perceived as rewarding the U.S. for 
disregarding the Protocol.3  
 
 
3. Technology Cooperation between the U.S. and China 
In the previous section, we argue that joint accession by the U.S. and China is not a way 
forward. However, this by no means prevents the two countries from cooperating in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China wished (Zhang, 
2000b). This situation has changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. 
3 The U.S. uses its re-entry of the Kyoto regime as a leverage to take on less stringent 
targets in the later commitment periods.  
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efforts to address climate issues by developing and deploying advanced energy 
technologies. Both the U.S. and China are participating in International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor program to develop fusion energy for peaceful purposes. Since 
June 2003, the U.S. has initiated the following four multilateral initiatives on technology 
cooperation. The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum seeks to develop improved 
cost-effective technologies for the separation and capture of carbon dioxide for its 
transport and long-term safe storage. Its purpose is to make these technologies broadly 
available internationally as a means of mitigating climate change.4 It currently includes 
21 countries and the EU. The International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy 
(IPHE) is an effort to “advance the global transition to the hydrogen economy with the 
goal of making fuel cell vehicles available by 2020”.5 Launched in November 2004, the 
Methane-to-Markets Partnership (M2M) advances cost-effective, near-term methane 
recovery from leaking oil and gas systems, underground coalmines and landfills and uses 
it as a source of clean energy.6 The U.S. government is committing up to US$ 53 million 
over the next five years to support this Partnership. Finally the Generation IV 
International Forum supports research and development for the next generation of safer, 
more affordable and more proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems.7 All of these 
initiatives emphasize the development and deployment of clean technology, and have not 
                                                 
4See the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum web sites at: 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/cslf; http://www.cslforum.org.   
5 See the IPHE web site at: http://www.iphe.net. Domestically, the IPHE is 
complemented by the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, which seeks to accelerate the transition to 
a hydrogen economy through cooperation with the private sector. 
6 See the M2M web sites at: http://www.epa.gov/methane/international.html; 
http://www.methanetomarkets.org.   
7 See the Generation IV International Forum web sit at: http://www.gen-4.org.   
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established legally binding emissions targets. They set out immediate and medium-term 
actions, including possible flagship projects, to achieve the stated outcomes.  
To date, China is only few developing countries that participate in all these U.S.-
led initiatives.8 For example, one flagship project under the M2M is that U.S.-based 
engine manufacturer Caterpillar Inc. was awarded a US$ 58 million contract from China 
to supply the power generation equipment for the world’s largest power plant fueled by 
coalbed and coal mine methane from the Sihe mine. This project is the result of 
collaborative efforts between the public and private sectors through the M2M. Once the 
power plant of 120 megawatts has been completed, 4.5 million tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions are estimated to be avoided each year. This is equivalent to take out 
emissions from one million cars annually (U.S. EPA, 2006). Except few projects like this, 
however, China’s participation in the U.S.-led initiatives is limited to large extent by lack 
of financial and technical capacity. This will limit the prospects for China to adopt 
advanced mitigation technologies at an early stage and thus undermine their effectiveness 
of helping China to significantly lower its growth rate of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Largely reflecting its belief that technological development, deployment and 
transfer is solution to climate problems, the U.S. proposed, and together with other five 
nations  – Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, announced in July 2005 the 
formation of the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP) in 
Vientiane. Australian and the U.S. governments claim that this pact is a technology-
                                                 
8 At the recent China-U.S.Strategic Economic Dialogue in Beijing, China agreed to join 
the Government Steering Committee of the FutureGen project, a US$1 billion initiative 
announced by President Bush in 2003 to build a prototype power plant of 275 megawatt 
that will remove and sequester carbon dioxide while producing electricity and hydrogen 
from coal. This makes China the third country to join the U.S. in the FutureGen 
International Partnership (U.S. DOE, 2006).  
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focussed, pro-growth approach to climate change. It is about substance rather than 
symbols; results rather than rhetoric. However, when the pact was announced, no details 
had been agreed on. So, while it drew great attention of the media, this lack of 
information led the European Union and its member states to be very cautious. Their 
initial official reactions turned to emphasize that the pact is not a substitute for global 
agreements like the Kyoto Protocol. But the views from the environmental groups 
worldwide and some leading politicians were very critical. The leading U.S. Senator John 
McCain said that the pact “amounts to nothing more than a nice little public-relations 
ploy…It has almost no meaning. They aren’t even committing money to the effort, much 
less enacting rules to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions” (quoted in Little (2005)). The 
environmental groups were fairly united, criticizing that the pact is nothing but a 
repackage of existing technology partnerships and short on sustance. 
Then, in January 2006, the six partner countries met at Sydney for their inaugural 
ministerial meeting to flesh out the APP. They adopted a Chapter aimed to implement the 
vision of pursuing development and poverty eradication, and jointly established eight 
public-private sector task forces (covering cleaner use of fossil energy, renewable energy 
and distributed generation, power generation and transmission, steel, aluminium, cement, 
coal mining, and buildings and appliances) and defined their work plans.9 It becomes also 
clear that the APP focuses on technological development, deployment and transfer. These 
fleshes help us to have a better understanding of the APP, although it is still very difficult 
to infer its full effectiveness at this stage. 
                                                 
9 See the APP web site at: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org. 
 11
The partnership brings together - for the first time – the six key developing and 
developed countries in the region to address the challenges of air pollution, energy 
security and climate change in a way that is designed to promote economic development 
and reduce poverty. The six countries represent almost half of world GDP, energy 
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and population. Given the scale of this group, 
theoretically speaking, the APP has the potential to make a significant impact. The U.S. 
led this initiative. On the U.S. side, the President Bush has requested US$ 52 million in 
the upcoming FY2007 budget to support the efforts of the APP. 
Based on the current information available, my adjument is that the APP can 
contribute the overall efforts, but whether it is going to deliver any substantial outcomes 
as Australian and the U.S. governments claim remains to be seen. Three reasons for my 
cautiousness. First, the partnership does not incorporate legally binding commitments or 
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Rather, it will rely on voluntargy measures to 
encourage the take-up of greenhouse gas reducing investments.This has raised serious 
concern about its effectiveness. Past experience shows that voluntary measures can be 
helpful, but not enough to ensure that new technologies will roll out at the pace and on 
the scale that we need. The modeling work by the ABARE (2006) indicates that, even 
with favorable assumptions on the timing and scope of adopting advanced technologies, 
global greenhouse gas emissions are expected to rise from 8 gigatons of carbon 
equivalent in 2001 to over 17 gigatons in 2050 as a result of the APP activities (see 
Figure 1).10 This means that global emissions would more than double with the APP, 
                                                 
10 Note that even if all commitments were met by Kyoto parties, global greenhouse gas 
emissions could still rise to well above the 1990 levels during the first commitment 
period. But what makes the Kyoto Protocol different from the APP is that the Protocol, as 
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although they would rise to over 22 gigatons in 2050 in the absence of the APP. This is 
far from the required greenhouse gas reductions in the order of 60-80% by the middle of 
this century to avoid dangerous climate-induced changes.  
 
Figure 1  Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2050 under Various Scenarios 
 
 
Partnership technology scenario refers to increased energy efficiency and uptakes of 
advanced energy technologies in key sectors; 
                                                                                                                                                 
agreed, is only intended as a first step, and includes specific reference to a second 
commitment period to follow the first. As exemplified by the Montreal Protocol, the 
history of international environmental agreements has almost entirely been one of 
increasing the scope and strength of commitments, and there is no fundamental reason 
why the future development of the Kyoto Protocol should be any different (Grubb et al., 
1999). Now the open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 
I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol was established at the COP/MOP1 in Montreal, 
December 2005 to have the charge of negotiating post-2012 commitments for developed 
countries. In its submission on future reduction paths, the European Union calls for 
developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 15-30% by 2020 and by 60-
80% by 2050 from their base year 1990 levels. 
 13
Partnership technology + CCS scenario refers to the same technology advances plus the 
use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies in electricity generation in all 
partnership countries at different times; 
Global technology + partnership CCS scenario refers to the diffusion of more energy 
efficient technologies throughout the world, with the CCS being used only within the 
partnership countries. 
Source: ABARE (2006).  
 
My another concern is the extent to which the APP is going to facilitate the 
transfers of low emission technologies, once they become available, to developing 
partners like China and India, beyond that already being achieved through the Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms like the clean development mechanism, which encourages the 
transfers of low or zero emission technologies to developing countries by allowing 
industrialized countries to meet part of their emission reduction obligations using the 
emission credits generated through investment in emission abating projects in developing 
countries. This is very crucial for China and India to deploy these technologies in order to 
significantly lower their growth rates of greenhouse gas emissions. This is the key 
criterion to assess the effectiveness of the APP. I believe that expectation for significant 
transfers of advanced energy technologies in addition to that already occurring under the 
CDM is the main motive for the two largest developing countries to join in the APP.11 
                                                 
11 Prodipto Ghosh, Secretary of the India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests, was 
quoted as saying that “we had hoped for much larger foreign direct investment. We are 
disappointed by the scale of foreign technology under CDM”. India is the second largest 
host of CDM projects (Zhang, 2000a, 2004 and 2006). Even if the Indian government is 
disappointed by the scale of technology transfer under the CDM, then prospect for 
 14
The question then is whether the two countries are able to get and afford to these 
technologies. This requires some kind of market incentives, given that most advanced 
technologies are commercially valuable and held by private companies. It is true that the 
APP views the private sector as critical to its efforts. But for now at least, I don’t see such 
market incentives there. Without such incentives, governments can do little to ensure the 
transfers of these technologies to the scale that we need to have a real impact on the 
emissions of these two countries. As a result, this will undermine the effectiveness of the 
APP. 
The third concern is the level of funding provided. The success of the APP will 
depend heavily on it. At this stage, Australia has promised AU$100 million over the next 
five years, and the Bush administration is struggling to persuade the Congress to approve 
the requested US$ 52 million in the upcoming FY2007 budget to support the efforts of 
the APP. To put these initial sums into perspective, the global carbon market was valued 
at  € 9.4 billion in 2005 (Point Carbon, 2006) and was estimated to be a value of US$ 
21.5 billion in the first nine months of 2006 (World Bank, 2006), while the combined 
value of the global markets for biofuels, wind power, solar PVs, and fuel cell and 
hydrogen equalled US$ 39.9 billion in 2005 (Clean Edge, 2006).12 Clearly, the sums are 
very small, compared with current investment in low or zero carbon emission 
technologies. Another reference is the overall need for investment in the energy sector. 
                                                                                                                                                 
technology transfer under the APP is hardly to be brighter than that under the CDM. See 
the AFP News “India ‘Disappointed’ by Foreign Help with Climate Change”, 7 
December 2006, Available at: 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20061207/wl_sthasia_afp/indiaclimatewarming. 
12 According to Clean Edge (2006), in the year 2005, the market for biofuels (ethanol and 
biodiesel) hit US$ 15.7 billion, the wind power and solar PVs markets reached US$ 11.8 
billion and US$ 11.2 billion respectively, while the fuel cell and distributed hydrogen 
market rose to US$ 1.2 billion.  
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IEA (2006) estimates that the cumulative investment of US$ 20.2 trillion is needed to 
meet increasing global energy demand over the period 2005-2030. While it is an open 
question to say that these initial sums are a drop in the ocean compared to what is needed, 
it is fair to say that the current funding provided is minute. Clearly, the APP leaves a 
large gap between its current funding commitments in emissions reduction and the 
overall needed investment in lower carbon technologies. The U.S. government expects 
the private sector to fill in the gap. James Connaughton, Chairman of the Council on 
Environmental Quality at the White House, was reported in January 2006 as saying that 
“the real dollars we are looking for are the private sector dollars, we are talking tens of 
billions of dollars if not hundreds of billions of dollars. If we don’t get the investment 
sector we can’t succeed.” (Quoted in Regan (2006)). In a testimony to the U.S. Senate’s 
Environment and Public Works Committee in September 2006, he said that the 
partnership’s success “should be measured not by how much governments and taxpayers 
spend on the effort, but on how much new private sector investment and financing can be 
unleashed and accelerated to achieve partnership security and environmental performance 
goals.” (Quoted in Griffin (2006)). The aforementioned eight sector task forces have 
developed an initial set of about 100 projects and activities under their corresponding 
Action Plans, and the Policy and Implementation Committee of the APP endorsed these 
plans at its meeting in Jeju Island, Korea, October 2006 (APP, 2006). It is expected that 
these sector task forces get something in the process of implementing an initial portfolio 
of these projects and activities. However, given that the APP does not have much money 
on the table and the past record of limited leverage of public funding, it is not at all clear 
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whether the APP is able to mobilize significant investment from the private sector to 
bridge the aforementioned large gap.  
 
   
4. Concluding Remarks 
The U.S. and China are the world’s largest and second largest CO2 emitters, respectively, 
and to what extent the U.S. and China get involved in combating global climate change is 
extremely important both for lowering compliance costs of climate mitigation and 
adaptation and for moving international climate negotiations forward. To get the world’s 
largest emitter back to the international regime, some analysts suggest for joint accession 
by the U.S. and China. While it is unavoidable that China will take on commitments at 
some specific point of time in the future, this paper has argued that the U.S. conditioning 
its commitments on China’s commitments is unlikely to induce China’s participation. For 
various reasons, such a proposal for a China-U.S. bilateral regime is in the U.S. interest, 
but is not in the interest of China. 
Political reality and institutional settings in the U.S. indicate that the country will 
not return to Kyoto anytime soon. Recognizing that, at least for the time being, 
cooperation under the Kyoto framework seems impossible, other forms of cooperation 
between the two largest emitters need to be encouraged and explored. The U.S. strongly 
believes that technology holds the key to solve climate problems, and accordingly has led 
the four multilateral initiatives in the areas of carbon separation and capture, hydrogen, 
methane recovery and advanced nuclear energy systems. All of these initiatives 
emphasize the development and deployment of clean technology, and set out immediate 
 17
and medium-term actions, including possible flagship projects, to achieve the stated goals. 
China has participated in all these U.S.-led initiatives. But its participation is limited to 
large extent by lack of financial and technical capacity. This will limit the prospects for 
China to adopt advanced mitigation technologies at an early stage. 
Largely inspired by the same basic principle, the U.S. proposed and, together with 
Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, formed the Asia Pacific Partnership for 
Clean Development and Climate. While environmental groups view the partnership as a 
breakaway from Kyoto, the partners describe it as complementary to – and not a 
substitute for – the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In my view, the APP can 
contribute the overall global efforts, by aligning a portfolio of very practical, sector-based 
actions to increase energy security, reduce air pollution and cut greenhouse gas emissions. 
Indeed, integrating energy security, air pollution and climate issues under the APP has 
been considered a plus. Take China and the U.S. as an example. Cooperation  on these 
broader issues will yield benefits to both countries as well as the whole world. To what 
extent energy conservation, hydropower, nuclear power and renewable energies are going 
to play in lowering the overall dominance of coal in China’s energy consumption and 
putting the country on the path further away from fossil fuel reliance in the future is an 
issue of perennial great concern, not simply for China because this gives rise to 
unprecedented environmental pollution and health risks in China (Zhang, 2005), but also 
for the U.S. because spreading air pollutants from China is reported to go as far away as 
the U.S. (quoted in Chea (2006)). Moreover, China is already the world’s second largest 
oil importer behind the U.S., importing over 40% of its oil consumption. If clean 
technologies from the U.S. are transferred and deployed in China, that will reduce its 
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needs for fossil fuels and increase alternative energy sources to meet a larger portion of 
the nation’s energy needs. This will reduce its growing hunger for foreign oil, leave more 
oil on the market, and thus help to stabilize the oil prices. This will significantly benefit 
the U.S., because this will reduce the world’s largest importer spending on oil and reduce 
potential conflicts between the two countries in the current and emerging oil fields.13 In 
addition, the APP could add some value to the Kyoto process by bringing some key 
missing players to the table, shedding lights on those sectors that have to date been left 
out by the CDM, and adding the flexibility in implementing actions. However, few 
people see the APP as a star policy recruit. For the various reasons, whether this 
voluntary, cash-hunger partnership is going to prove a valuable team player remains to be 
seen. 
Finally, I like to emphasize that the role of the U.S. is of paramount importance to 
either effective China-U.S. cooperation or global efforts towards climate control. The U.S. 
has led several multilateral efforts in this area, but has not taken the lead in global efforts 
towards combating global climate change. Winston Churchill said that “[you] can always 
count on the Americans to do the right thing – after exhausting every other alternative.”. 
In my view, the U.S. leading the world in climate control or setting a good example for 
China may well be remembered as a case where Americans can do the right thing after 
exhausting at least some of the alternatives. Only history will tell us whether that will be 
a case. 
 
                                                 
13 China’s practice of oil diplomacy is widely perceived in Washington as attempts to 
threaten U.S. security interests because Beijing strikes deals either with the so-called 
rogue states that Washington has tried to marginalize or in America’s backyard which 
Washington perceives as its turf and within its traditional sphere of influence (Zhang, 
2007). 
 19
Acknowledgments 
The second part of this paper was originally written as part of the invited lead speech on 
“Reconstructing Climate Policy: How Best to Engage China and other Major Emitting 
Countries?” at the International Conference on Reconstructing Climate Policy: Moving 
Beyond the Kyoto Impasse, 11-12 May 2003, Duke University. The third part was 
motivated by an interview with Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations, 
Harvard University, July 2006. That said, the views expressed here are those of the 
author. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and omissions that may remain.  
 
  
References 
ABARE (2006), Technological Development and Economic Growth, Research Report 
No. 06.1, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), 
Canberra, Available at: 
www.abareconomics.com/publications_html/climate/climate_06/06_climate.pdf.
Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (APP, 2006), Asia Pacific 
Partnership for Clean Development and Climate Executive Summary of Task 
Force Action Plans, Available at: 
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/ActionPlans.htm. 
Chea, T. (2006), China’s Growing Pollution Reaches U.S., Fox News, July 28, Available 
at: 
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2006Jul28/0,4670,TransPacificPollution,00.html. 
 20
Clean Edge (2006), Clean Energy Trends 2006, Available at: 
www.cleanedge.com/reports/trends2006.pdf. 
Griffin, M. (2006), Asia-Pacific Partnership: Climate Policy or Climate Ploy, Carbon 
Finance Asia 2006, A Special Supplement to Environmental Finance, pp. 16-19. 
Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C. and D. Brack (1999), The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and 
Assessment, Earthscan, London. 
IEA (2006), World Energy Outlook 2006, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris. 
Little, A. (2005), Pact or Fiction?: New Asia-Pacific Climate Pact is Long on PR, Short 
on Substance, Available at: http://grist.org/news/muck/2005/08/04/little-
pact/?source=muck. 
Point Carbon (2006), Carbon 2006: Towards a Truly Global Market, Oslo, Norway. 
Regan, J. (2006), US Says Industry Key to Six-Nation Climate Pact, Reuters, January 11, 
Available at: 
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/34413/newsDate/11-Jan-
2006/story.htm. 
Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener (2003), Reconstructing Climate Policy: 
Beyond Kyoto, American Enterprise Press, Washington, DC. 
U.S. DOE (2006), U.S. and China Announce Cooperation on FutureGen and Sign Energy 
Efficiency Protocol at U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, Press Release, 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Available at: 
http://www.doe.gov/news/4535.htm. 
U.S. EPA (2006), Power Plant to be Largest Run on Coal Mine Methane, Press Release, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),  May 18, Available at: 
 21
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/4d84d5d9a719de8c85257018005467c2/
8ec89e33e48a863f852571720063e8d7!OpenDocument. 
World Bank (2006), State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2006: A Focus on Africa, 
Washington, DC, November. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2000a), Estimating the Size of the Potential Market for the Kyoto 
Flexibility Mechanisms, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv - Review of World 
Economics, Vol. 136, No. 3, pp. 491-521. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2000b), Can China Afford to Commit itself an Emissions Cap? An Economic 
and Political Analysis, Energy Economics, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 587-614. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2004), Meeting the Kyoto Targets: The Importance of Developing Country 
Participation, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 3-19. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2005), Sustainable Energy Development in China: Challenges Ahead to 
2020, The Keynote Address at the International Conference on “Staying Ahead of 
the Energy Scenarios”, Bangkok, Thailand, November 11. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2006), Cutting Carbon Emissions While Making Money: A Wishful 
Thinking or A Win-Win Opportunity?, The Keynote Address at the Plenary 
Session on Making Money from Saving Carbon at the 29th International 
Association for Energy Economics International Conference, Potsdam, Germany,  
June 8. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2007), China’s Hunt for Oil in Africa in Perspective, Energy and 
Environment, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 87-92. 
 
 22
